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Abstract 
 
CHRISTIAN STOICISM 
 
While the theological assumptions of Christianity and Stoicism may seem 
disparate, their philosophies are highly compatible. This compatibility is one of the 
reasons that early Christian authors looked to pagan Stoic authors for support and 
inspiration. Many Stoic and Christian authors compiled manuals for right living. The 
historical connections and conceptual similarities between the two schools of 
thought suggest the viability and value of constructing a combined Christian-Stoic 
manual of wisdom. Such is the constructive task of this thesis. Passages from 
Christian and Stoic sources are brought together to illustrate major common 
themes. The passages are followed by original commentaries that suggest the 
relevant insights that can be drawn from them. The goal is to show the ongoing 
relevance of these ancient writings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
WHY CHRISTIAN STOICISM? 
Why, indeed? After all, according to theologian Paul Tillich, stoicism is opposed to 
Christianity. Stoicism, Tillich writes, “is the only real alternative to Christianity in 
the Western world.”1 For the Stoic, reason is both the means to an end and the end 
itself, as philosophical virtue is the perfection of reason. For the Christian, reason is 
merely the means to an end, namely, the end: that is to say, God, the perfection of 
theological virtue. For the Stoic, the Christian overextends; for the Christian, the 
Stoic is too shortsighted. Therefore, Tillich claims that Stoicism and Christianity are 
necessarily incompatible. Their incompatibility, it seems, ultimately lies in their 
theology. The Christian is a sworn monotheist (Trinitarian conceptions of the one, 
true God aside). The Stoic professes pantheism: the spark of divinity that resides in 
all things moves them toward the end previously mentioned.  
Yet while their theology may be incompatible, their philosophy is more than 
compatible. Several instances of compatibility will be examined in this thesis. By 
way of introduction, consider the example of ethics. Like all schools of ancient 
ethics, Stoic ethics is eudemonistic: the goal of moral living is to achieve ultimate 
happiness for oneself and, to the extent possible, for others.2 Christian ethics can 
also be considered eudemonistic, at least in the Catholic patristic-medieval tradition 
of Christianity that wills the primary point of comparison with Stoicism in this 
thesis. The question is how far the similarity may be presses, because in defining the 
                                                        
1 Paul Tillich, The Courage To Be (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), 9. 
2 See Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
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content of human happiness, Christian and Stoic philosophies seem to differ. The 
Stoic philosopher Seneca supposed that happiness is moving-with, not moving-
against, nature: One should not swim upstream, as it were, or else suffer distress, be 
it from slower progress or greater effort exerted. St. Thomas Aquinas instead 
supposed that happiness is being-with, not being-without, God: One should not sin 
and, in so doing, distance herself from God, or else further alienate herself and make 
of herself an island. Does it follow, however, that these two ways of thinking about 
happiness are as opposed as they appear? The argument presented in this thesis is 
that they need not be opposed. The Stoic and Christian visions of happiness are, in 
fact, complementary.  
While the Stoic is always looking resolutely at the grim realities of life, the 
Christian tends to look away from present travails toward the future enjoyment of 
God in a beatific vision. While Stoic happiness might be less concerned with these 
future things, and Christian happiness might be concerned less with these present 
things, it seems the former happiness can, and ought to, follow the latter, especially 
for the virtuous. For both the Christian and the Stoic, virtue perfects reason, and 
being reasonable ultimately leads to happiness. The system of morality that 
concerns appropriate living in the natural world during the scope of human life has 
been called natural law; it is a system of ethics that Stoicism and Catholic 
Christianity make central. Thomas Aquinas, the great medieval theorist of Christian 
natural law, adds the forward-looking, Christian component, which is Divine law. 
Human reason attuned to the natural law concerns itself with good and evil, as 
Seneca describes, while human reason guided by Divine law looks to the One who 
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set the natural order in motion.  
Though this is but one example of the potential compatibility of Stoic and 
Christian thought, it makes some sense to investigate more thoroughly the shared 
history of the two traditions. In doing so, this thesis will illustrate the ways in which 
Tillich and much of modern theology may have overlooked a historically founded 
lifestyle choice for Christians in the past, as well as demonstrating that such a 
lifestyle—a Christian-Stoic lifestyle—is still a viable one for Christians today. The 
approach to this demonstration will be in two main parts.  
Chapter 1 provides historical background on Stoicism and Christianity, 
demonstrating not only the similarities in their worldviews but the many historical 
encounters and overlaps between them. For the purposes of this project, it is fair to 
call Stoicism and Christianity “schools” of thought, because, over the first several 
centuries of Christianity, thinkers from the two traditions interacted in ways akin to 
the interaction of the ancient schools of philosophy: commenting on each other, 
criticizing each other, and sometimes incorporating each other’s ideas. This chapter 
illustrates that both Stoic and Christian writers often presented their moral 
teachings in the form of manuals of guidance. Some writings are clearly in a manual 
form—most famously, the Stoic philosopher Epictetus’s Enchiridion. Perhaps less 
well known is the fact that much of the moral teaching in the New Testament takes a 
manual form. In fact, Paul and other New Testament epistle writers at times 
modeled their moral instruction on commonplace moral codes that were Stoic in 
nature.  
Chapter 1 is divided into three parts. The first explains the development from 
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Stoicism from its Socratic and Cynic roots. The second surveys the encounters of 
early Christianity with Stoicism. The third makes the case that—for reasons 
historical, conceptual, and ethical—it is a viable project to compile a Christian-Stoic 
manual of living.  
Chapter 2 does just that. The approach is to take several important themes 
from each school and to identify a classic Stoic passage and a classic Christian 
passage (a biblical text or passage from a Church Doctor, such as Aquinas) on the 
theme. The commentaries that follow each pair of passages will argue for the overall 
compatibility of the teachings and suggest the relevant insights that can be drawn 
from them. The goal is to show the ongoing relevance of these ancient writings to 
any reader who wants to better understand and achieve true happiness. 
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CHAPTER 1 
BACKGROUND ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF CHRISTIANITY AND STOICISM 
 
I. FROM SOCRATICS TO CYNICS TO STOICS 
Just as Christianity came as a child out of Judaism, Stoicism rose out of Cynicism and, 
in the same way, existed alongside its parent, even if sometimes contentiously. In a 
likewise similar fashion, the early Stoics understood themselves as Cynics, though 
later Stoics such as Epictetus believed that the ideal Cynic was really a Stoic, as 
disciples of both schools modeled themselves on Socrates. As Epictetus writes:  
A Cynic… must, then, if it should so happen, be able to lift up his voice, to 
come upon the stage, and say, like Socrates: “O mortals, whither are you 
hurrying? What are you about? Why do you tumble up and down, O 
miserable wretches… like blind men? You seek prosperity and happiness in a 
wrong place, where they are not; nor do you give credit to another, who 
shows you where they are. Why do you seek this possession without?”3 
 
It is therefore appropriate that, before we undergo a brief overview of the Cynics, 
we first undergo a brief overview of the Socratics. Once the basic views of the Sage 
of sages is established and better understood, a selection of his students—Cynic and 
Stoic alike—will likewise be established, accompanied by comparisons to Christian 
ideas and historical responses. 
 The first Socratic, if he can even be named as such, was none other than 
Socrates himself. According to Diogenes Laertius—who catalogued the lives of many 
ancient philosophers, some of whose ideas would otherwise be lost to us—Socrates 
                                                        
3 Epictetus, The Works of Epictetus: His Discourses, in Four Books, the Enchiridion, and 
Fragments, trans. Thomas Wentworth Higginson (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 
1890), 3.22.  
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was the son of an Athenian sculptor and a midwife. This should hardly surprise us, 
however, as Plato, in the Theaetetus, repeatedly characterizes Socrates as a sort-of 
midwife himself, bringing to birth seemingly new ideas. The intellectual midwife 
likely aided his peer Euripides in playwriting and was most certainly teased by 
Aristophanes for it. Furthermore, as Laertius writes,  
According to some authors he was a pupil of Anaxagoras, and also of 
Damon…. When Anaxagoras was condemned, he became a pupil of Archelaus 
the physicist…. Duris makes him out to have been a slave and to have been 
employed on stonework, and the draped figures of the Graces on the 
Acropolis have by some been attributed to him…. From these diverged the 
sculptor, a prater about laws, the enchanter of Greece, inventor of subtle 
arguments, the sneerer who mocked at fine speeches, half-Attic in his mock 
humility.4 
 
This sculptor, prater, enchanter inventor and sneerer was a wordsmith of 
unequalled measure, infamously said to be able to make the weaker argument the 
stronger and, as a result, banned by the leading citizens of Athens from teaching. He 
was nonetheless credited for teaching rhetoric and a sort-of philosophy of life 
before being put to death for those very reasons by envious accusers.  
Socrates rarely left his home state of Athens, except when he served in the 
military. He was ever a moral exemplar, living very plainly, with great dignity, and 
without ornament. In Xenophon’s Symposium, Socrates claims that there is “only one 
good, that is, knowledge, and only one evil, that is, ignorance; wealth and good birth 
bring their possessor no dignity, but on the contrary evil.”5 He was known 
throughout Athens as the wisest of all men living and was greatly envied as such. 
                                                        
4 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans. R.D. Hicks (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1972), 2.5.19. 
5 Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 2.5.31. 
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After Socrates’s death, the wise man was honored as a hero: his accusers were 
brought to justice and banished, and his supporters erected a bronze statue of his 
likeness in the hall of processions. His students were many, and his influence on 
Greek and later Roman thought staggering. While we will not speak further of the 
Socratics proper here, focusing instead on the life and times of Antisthenes, Plato 
and Xenophon, especially, are two of Socrates’ most famous students. It is for that 
reason that a few of their contributions even to Laertius’s account are mentioned. 
Antisthenes is quite another character altogether: On the one hand, he is 
every bit the Socratic as Plato and Xenophon, though on the other he is a Cynic 
throughout. The son of an Athenian and a Thracian, Antisthenes was a student of the 
rhetorician Gorgias before meeting—and encouraging others to meet—the 
sculptor/midwife extraordinaire Socrates. As Laertius remarks, “He lived in the 
Peiraeus, and every day would tramp the five miles to Athens in order to hear 
Socrates. From Socrates he learned his hardihood, emulating his disregard of 
feeling, and thus he inaugurated the Cynic way of life. He demonstrated that pain is a 
good thing by instancing the great Heracles and Cyrus, drawing the one example 
from the Greek world and the other from the barbarians.”6 This hardihood, as 
Laertius writes, is the very foundation of the Cynic school. Antisthenes’ favorite 
themes—and those of the Cynic school, perhaps named for their many 
conversations in the gymnasium called Cynosarges (“White Hound”)—are as 
follows: 
                                                        
6 Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 6.1.2. 
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He would prove that virtue can be taught; that nobility belongs to none other 
than the virtuous. And he held virtue to be sufficient in itself to ensure 
happiness, since it needed nothing else except the strength of a Socrates. And 
he maintained that virtue is an affair of deeds and does not need a store of 
words or learning; that the wise man is self-sufficing, for all the goods of 
others are his; that ill repute is a good thing and much the same as pain; that 
the wise man will be guided in his public acts not by the established laws but 
by the law of virtue; that he will also marry in order to have children from 
union with the handsomest women; furthermore that he will not disdain to 
love, for only the wise man knows who are worthy to be loved.  
To the wise man nothing is foreign or impracticable. A good man 
deserves to be loved. Men of worth are friends. Make allies of men who are at 
once brave and just. Virtue is a weapon that cannot be taken away. It is better 
to be with a handful of good men fighting against all the bad, than with hosts 
of bad men against a handful of good men. Pay attention to your enemies, for 
they are the first to discover your mistakes. Esteem an honest man above a 
kinsman. Virtue is the same for women as for men. Good actions are fair and 
evil actions foul. Count all wickedness foreign and alien. 
Wisdom is a most sure stronghold, which never crumbles away nor is 
betrayed. Walls of defense must be constructed in our own impregnable 
reasoning.”7 
 
Men that practiced what Antisthenes preached conversed with him at Cynosarges, 
forming what would become a new academy there. These men of the White Hound 
gymnasium were often called hounds themselves, and Antisthenes was chief among 
them. These hounds grew fond of the nickname, and of the other, more historically 
significant moniker: Cynic.  
Laertius notes also that Antisthenes “gave impulse to the indifference of 
Diogenes, the continence of Crates, and the hardihood of Zeno, himself laying the 
foundations of their state.”8 Antisthenes’ most famous student was Diogenes of 
Sinope, the son of a banker and an exile living in Athens. It was there that he met 
                                                        
7 Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 6.1.10-13. 
8 Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 6.1.15. 
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Antisthenes and eventually became his pupil. Like Antisthenes before him, he folded 
his cloak over on itself as a coat, carrying what little he owned in an oversized wallet 
and walking with a staff. Diogenes intentionally lived in poverty and engaged in 
unusual practices meant to discipline his desires, such as living in a tub (not 
altogether different from the later Christian ascetic from Syrian, Saint Simeon 
Stylites, who lived on top of a narrow pillar) and rolling in the sand in the summer 
and the snow in the winter. Throughout his life, Diogenes sought to do what 
Antisthenes did, and what Antisthenes’s teacher before him, Socrates, did: In living 
simply, Diogenes called others to a simpler life of simple virtue. 
As Laertius writes,  
One day, observing a child drinking out of his hands, he cast away the cup 
from his wallet [his bag] with the words, “A child has beaten me in plainness 
of living.” He also threw away his bowl when in like manner he saw a child 
who had broken his plate taking up his lentils with the hollow part of a 
morsel of bread. He used also to reason thus: “All things belong to the gods. 
The wise are friends of the gods, and friends hold things in common. 
Therefore all things belong to the wise.”9  
 
For as many tales of Diogenes’ commonality of spirit and friendship, Laertius 
lists twice as many antagonistic encounters. His retorts and quips rival on the 
comical, often pushing Cynicism to extremes Antisthenes wouldn’t have dreamed of 
(but giving later generations a convenient term for this biting sarcasm: cynicism). 
Cynicism aside, the Athenians loved Diogenes, even if his philosophical peers, Plato 
in particular, cared little for him. Laertius recounts an encounter between Diogenes 
and the emperor Alexander, illustrating why the philosopher alienated people:  
                                                        
9 Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 6.2.37. 
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“…Alexander, once came and stood opposite him and said, “I am Alexander 
the great king.” “And I,” said he, “am Diogenes the Cynic.” Being asked what 
he had done to be called a hound, he said, “I fawn on those who give me 
anything, I yelp at those who refuse, and I set my teeth in rascals.’”10  
 
Diogenes trained both his mind and his body, asserting that the one was 
nothing without the other. Craftsmen and gymnasts are skilled in the sort of practice 
he preached, and nothing in life was possible without practice. According Laertius, 
Diogenes taught as follows: 
Strenuous practice… is capable of overcoming anything. Accordingly, instead 
of useless toils men should choose such as nature recommends, whereby 
they might have lived happily. Yet such is their madness that they choose to 
be miserable. For even the despising of pleasure is itself most pleasurable, 
when we are habituated to it; and just as those accustomed to a life of 
pleasure feel disgust when they pass over to the opposite experience, so 
those whose training has been of the opposite kind derive more pleasure 
from despising pleasure than from the pleasures themselves…the manner of 
life he lived was the same as that of Heracles when he preferred liberty to 
everything.11 
 
 Diogenes’ most famous pupil was a Theban called Crates, a farmer of some 
wealth. According to Diocles, Diogenes persuaded Crates to give up his farm and 
throw his riches into the sea. He was often the subject of much abuse: He was ugly to 
look at, and was physically assaulted often and openly mocked even more. Even his 
own kinsman, furious that the Cynic had disposed of his wealth and ever-bent on 
diverting him from his cause, would confront him, though Crates was unshakable 
and could, as it is said, “Give ‘em as good as he could take ‘em.” His most famous 
student, Zeno of Citium, related in his Anecdotes that, when Crates was being 
                                                        
10 Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 6.2.60. 
11 Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 6.2.71. 
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laughed at in the gymnasium, Zeno would say, “’Take heart, Crates, for it is for the 
good of your eyes and of the rest of your body. You will see these men, who are 
laughing at you, tortured before long by disease, counting you happy, and 
reproaching themselves for their sluggishness.”12 Crates was nonetheless a student 
of strenuous practice, understanding that scorn and ridicule are but an additional 
grounds to train in virtue. 
 Zeno was, in every sense, Crates’ most famous student, though a poor Cynic 
in many cases. Zeno’s tangos with Cynicism for the better part of twenty years, 
though he finds that the shameless way of the hound is ultimately too shameful: As 
Laertius writes, “Crates… gave him a potful of lentil-soup to carry through the 
Ceramicus [The potter’s quarter, from which the English word “Ceramics” comes]; 
and when he saw that he was ashamed and tried to keep it out of sight, with a blow 
of his staff he broke the pot. As Zeno took to flight with the lentil-soup flowing down 
his legs, ‘Why run away, my little Phoenician?’ quoted Crates, ‘nothing terrible has 
befallen you.’”13 Gone is the shamelessness of Diogenes here, though the desire for 
virtue through strenuous practice still remained, as did much of the ethical statutes 
of Cynicism. What remained was the foundation of Zenoian thought.  
 After leaving Crates’ tutelage, Zeno would discourse while pacing up and 
down the painted Stoa, or colonnade. His followers would do the same, earning 
them the name Stoics, literally, “the men of the Stoa.” Like Diogenes, Zeno was 
greatly loved by the Athenians, though he was not nearly as antagonistic to them as 
                                                        
12 Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 6.5.91-92. 
13 Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 7.1.2. 
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his predecessor. He was honored by King Antigonus (Gonatas) for his great virtue at 
the ripe old age of eighty. The king begged the old man to teach him—and, through 
him, the whole of Macedonia—in the ways of ethics and eudaimonia. Unlike earlier 
Cynics, Zeno was known to keep some money, for the shamelessness of begging, he 
decided, was unbecoming of a philosopher, especially one who espoused self-
sufficiency. In order to better share with his friends and neighbors, Zeno lent them 
money with great generosity throughout his life. 
 Whereas the earlier Cynics saw ignorance as humans’ greatest enemy, Zeno 
despised arrogance and conceit even more. He was well known for chastising youth 
for their pride and vanity, reminding them that they are no greater than the 
homeless and the beggars whose shoulders they rub. He never stopped learning and 
never asserted that he was more learned than another, as there was always 
something he could learn from him. His dress and eating were simple, as was 
common of the Cynics, though he perhaps imbibed more than Crates. Temperance 
was his greatest virtue, and it became the central virtue of the Stoic school. Laertius 
remarks, “And in very truth in this species of virtue and in dignity he surpassed all 
mankind, ay, and in happiness; for he was ninety-eight when he died and had 
enjoyed good health without an ailment to the last.”14 
  
                                                        
14 Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 7.1.28. 
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II. EARLY CHRISTIANITY’S ENCOUNTERS WITH STOICISM 
With the rise of Stoicism came the decline of Cynicism, in part because Stoicism’s 
departure from Cynic antagonism made it more appealing to a wider audience. 
However, the transition was gradual, as early Christians gravitated toward Cynic 
asceticism and poverty. Maximus of Alexandria, for example, was called both a Cynic 
and a Christian for his asceticism. Jesus Seminar member Burton L. Mack supposed 
that Jesus himself was something akin to a sagacious Cynic, even going as far as to 
assert that Jesus’ peers would recognize him as such.15 Despite some similarities 
between Jesus and, say, Diogenes, neither of whom minced words when speaking to 
men in authority, it seems quite unlikely that Jesus would be identified as a Cynic. 
While both Jesus and the Cynics were brazenly anti-elitist and non-materialistic, the 
Cynics lived this way to show status-quo sensibilities, while Jesus, in his Jewish 
context, maintained a given amount of ritual cleanliness. The Cynics lived purposely 
“unclean,” while Jesus challenged the Jewish leaders’ concepts of true cleanliness. 
Commenting on the dietary purity laws, he said, “It is not what enters one’s mouth 
that defiles that person; but what comes out of the mouth is what defiles one.”.16 
With that being said, Jesus still observed these purity laws and was not himself 
unclean, even if he routinely surrounded himself with those who were: tax 
collectors and prostitutes, for example.  
                                                        
15 B. L. Mack, The Lost Gospel: The Book of Q and Christian Origins (San Francisco: 
HarperCollins, 1993) 245. 
16 Matthew 15:11 NAB 
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While the early Christians appreciated the Cynic ideal in much the same way 
that Epictetus and later Stoics did, these Christians were, like Zeno, repulsed by the 
Cynics “shameless” lifestyle. As Saint Augustine writes:  
It is this which those canine or cynic philosophers have overlooked, when 
they have, in violation of the modest instincts of men, boastfully proclaimed 
their unclean and shameless opinion, worthy indeed of dogs… that as the 
matrimonial act is legitimate, no one should be ashamed to perform it openly, 
in the street or any public place. Instinctive shame has overborne this wild 
fancy. For though it is related that Diogenes once dared to put his opinion in 
practice, under the impression that his sect would be all the more famous if 
his egregious shamelessness were deeply graven in the memory of mankind, 
yet this example was not afterwards followed. Shame had more influence 
with them, to make them blush before men, than error to make them affect a 
resemblance to dogs. And possibly, even in the case of Diogenes, and those 
who did imitate him, there was but an appearance and pretense of 
copulation, and not the reality.17 
 
While the same could not be said of Zeno and his “shameful, blushing” Stoic 
followers, their linked heritage was nonetheless known throughout the ancient 
world. Laertius’s overview of the Cynics and Stoics ends with Zeno and his students, 
known colloquially as the “Early Stoa.” These early Stoa preached physical, ethical 
and logical doctrines, much of which were thought by Cynics, such as Diogenes, to be 
highly impractical and, as such, a waste of time and effort. The three doctrines are 
necessarily connected, and include rhetoric and dialectic.  
Reason reigns supreme for the Stoic: As Laertius writes, “All things, they say, 
are discerned by means of logical study, including whatever falls within the province 
                                                        
17 Aurelius Augustine, The Works, Volume 1: The City of God, trans. Rev. Marcus Dods 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1913), XIV.20. 
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of Physics, and again whatever belongs to that of Ethics.”18 The ethical life—that is, 
the virtuous life—is lived in accordance with nature. This nature is none other than 
the law common to all things, also called reason. While Thomas might be inclined to 
call this common law God, the early Stoa were content identifying it as the ruler and 
lord of all, Zeus. It is for this reason that even Epictetus, himself a late Stoa, 
identified the ideal Cynics—and Stoics—as divine messengers of Zeus. Happiness, 
for these messengers, resulted from virtue alone, bringing harmony to the 
individual and the universe. 
As opposed to Cynic shamelessness, Stoics practiced a sort of indifference 
characterized by preference and rejection. For example, some Stoics possessed 
material wealth but, as we will later see, did not necessarily prescribe to any sort of 
materialism: The Stoic owns his possessions and is, as a result, not owned by them 
and owes nothing to them. It is this sort of indifference that carries well past the 
early Stoa, including Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Diogenes of Babylon and 
Antipater; middle Stoa such as Panaetius and Posidonius, and well into the period of 
the late Stoa. By the Roman era, Stoic philosophy had flourished both in and beyond 
Athens, and the works of the late Stoa are the only ones that survive intact. The 
period is typically thought to have begun with Lucius Annaeus Seneca, born around 
the time of Christ and ended with Emperor Marcus Aurellius in the third century. 
Epictetus and his teacher, Musonius Rufus, fall between the two. In his Discourses, 
Epictetus speaks briefly about one of Rufus’s most challenging lessons: being 
                                                        
18 Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 7.1.83. 
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consistently critical. Epictetus writes of one of his conversations with his teacher 
Rufus: 
“Suppose, after all, I should make a mistake… it is not as if I had killed my 
father.”… This very thing I myself said to Rufus when he reproved me for not 
finding the weak point in some syllogism. “Why,” said I, “have I burnt the 
capitol then?” “Slave!” answered he, “was the thing here involved the capitol? 
Or are there no other faults but burning the capitol, or killing a father?”19  
 
It is not enough for the Stoic to, as common sense would have it, refrain from killing 
his father or burning the capitol: For the Stoic, logical and argumentative structures 
are no less important than familial or governmental establishments.   
While little more can be said of Rufus and Epictetus—the former, a famous 
teacher and the latter, his even more famous student—their writings speak much 
for themselves. Only fragments of Rufus’s Discourses remain, while Epictetus’s 
student Arrian wrote down Epictetus’s discourses drawing from his teacher’s 
lectures. Arrian then went on two compile a companion piece to his master’s 
discourses, constructed from sayings, fragments and integral portions of the 
Discourses; it is titled The Enchiridion. It is at this time that the early Christians begin 
composing and compiling their New Testament, specifically St. Paul’s epistles; the 
Gospels of Mark, Matthew, and Luke; and the companion history to Luke, known as 
the Acts of the Apostles. In the Acts of the Apostles, Paul makes his way through 
Thessalonica and Beroea, spreading the gospel like wildfire before making his way 
to Athens.20 While Athens may have been less politically significant than Rome at 
                                                        
19 Epictetus, Discourses, 1.7. 
20 Acts 17. 
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this point in history, it remained an important cultural center for Greek thought. It is 
there, on the Royal Porch, that Paul encounters Stoicism head-on.  
While Paul was waiting for them in Athens, he grew exasperated at the sight 
of the city full of idols. So he debated in the synagogue with the Jews and with 
the worshipers, and daily in the public square with whoever happened to be 
there. Even some of the Epicurean and Stoic philosophers engaged him in 
discussion. Some asked, “What is this scavenger trying to say?” Others said, 
“He sounds like a promoter of foreign deities,” because he was preaching 
about “Jesus” and “resurrection.” 
They took him and led him to Areopagus and said, “May we learn what 
this new teaching is that you speak of? For you bring some strange notions to 
our ears; we should like to know what these things mean.” Now all the 
Athenians as well as the foreigners residing there used their time for nothing 
else but telling or hearing something new.21 
 
After preaching the Good News to the Athenians, Paul wins a few new followers and 
leaves them.22 However, he does not leave the Athenians unaffected by them. The 
Stoics, especially, greatly influenced his theology, as evidenced by the plurality of 
strong parallels between Pauline and Stoic thought. Paul’s thoughts on sin and death 
in his letter to the Romans, especially, strongly echo those of his contemporary, 
Epictetus in the Enchiridion. By looking more closely at these passages, one can 
discover connections between Paul and Epictetus. First, this is Paul’s reflection on 
sin and death: 
Did the good, then, become death for me? Of course not! Sin, in order that it 
might be shown to be sin, worked death in me through the good, so that sin 
might become sinful beyond measure through the commandment.  
We know that the law is spiritual; but I am carnal, sold into slavery to 
sin. What I do, I do not understand. For I do not do what I want, but I do what 
I hate. 
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Now if I do what I do not want, I concur that the law is good. So now it 
is no longer I who do it, but sin that dwells in me. For I know that good does 
not dwell in me, that is, in my flesh. The willing is ready at hand, but doing 
the good is not. For I do not do the good I want, but I do the evil I do not 
want. 
Now if [I] do not want, it is no longer I who do it, but sin that dwells in 
me. So, then, I discover the principle that when I want to do right, evil is at 
hand. 
For I take delight in the law of God, in my inner self, but I see in my 
members another principle at war with the law of my mind, taking me 
captive to the law of sin that dwells in my members. 
Miserable one that I am! Who will deliver me from this mortal body? 
Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord. Therefore, I myself, with my 
mind, serve the law of God but, with my flesh, the law of sin.23 
 
And this is Epictetus: 
 
Men are disturbed, not by things, but by the principles and notions which 
they form concerning things. Death, for instance, is not terrible, or else it 
would have appeared so to Socrates. But the terror consists in our notion of 
death that it is terrible. When therefore we are hindered, or disturbed, or let 
us never attribute it to others, but to ourselves; that is, to our own principles. 
An uninstructed person will lay the fault of his own bad condition upon 
others. Someone just starting instruction will lay the fault on himself. Some 
who is perfectly instructed will place blame neither on others nor on 
himself.24 
 
Both passages revolve around an understanding of principle as guiding action. 
While this is clear enough in Epictetus’s passage, the word “principle” doesn’t even 
appear until the end of Paul’s. The subtlety lies in the language here: The Greek 
νόμος (“law”) can also be translated as “custom,” “system,” or—most importantly—
“principle,”25 more clearly in line with what Epictetus writes. That law and principle 
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24 Epictetus, Enchiridion (New York: Classic Books America, 2009), V.  
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are related insofar as both of these, by design, guide actions may not be immediately 
apparent: The former concerns itself chiefly with the cardinal virtue of justice and 
the latter with wisdom, but the latter is of greater import to the sage and, as a result, 
also to this project. While the just, law-abiding man knows what is right and wrong, 
the wise man knows what is best: That is to say, what will improve him and his, 
which can only be – for Paul at least – the grace of God. He elaborates upon this 
difference as follows: 
Far from improving the sinner, law encourages sin to expose itself in 
transgressions or violations of specific commandments…. Thus persons who 
do not experience the justifying grace of God, and Christians who revert to 
dependence on law as the criterion for their relationship with God, will 
recognize a rift between their reasoned desire for the goodness of the law 
and their actual performance that is contrary to the law. Unable to free 
themselves from the slavery of sin and the power of death, they can only be 
rescued from defeat in the conflict by the power of God’s grace working 
through Jesus Christ.26 
 
Prior to this passage in Romans, Paul suggests that man necessarily finds 
himself in a slave-master relationship either with God or with sin.27 Through the 
ongoing work of the Holy Spirit, a person of faith finds that the bonds of sin are 
broken and bonds himself or herself to God. While sin bound humanity to death, 
Paul explains, God binds humanity to life everlasting. The only thing that stands in 
the way of attaining righteousness and purity is the impure body, which must be 
sanctified or otherwise made holy. Before the Holy Spirit and the Son were sent, the 
Father provided his chosen people with the Law, traditionally understood as the 
613 mitzvot (“Commandments”) of the Torah, the first third of the Hebrew Bible. In 
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keeping these commandments, Jews believed they would be made holy. Christians—
Paul included—therefore turned or returned to the law, but found that, in light of 
Jesus’ teachings, the law was more or less antiquated: “But now we are released 
from the law, dead to what held us captive, so that we may serve in the newness of 
the spirit and not under the obsolete letter.”28 It is the letter of the law, after all, that 
taught man what sin was, as Paul says: “I did not know sin except through the law, 
and I did not know what it is to covet except that the law said, ‘You shall not 
covet’.”29 
 Now, Paul is not suggesting that laws and principles are evil. After all, God is 
good, and God’s law must therefore also be good. The letter of the law—the fine 
print, if you will—can obscure the spirit of the law, even going so far as to seemingly 
inspire the very act the law forbids. Though the law is spiritual by design, one trying 
to abide by the law can do no better than to respond carnally, bringing to birth the 
internal struggle that Paul continually highlights: Time and time again, Paul finds 
that he does what he hates (Sin) and not what he loves (God’s will). Without Jesus to 
save and deliver him from the bondage of sin, Paul asserts that he would powerless 
to do otherwise, and his struggle is every human being’s struggle. 
 While it might initially appear that Epictetus disagrees on this point, this 
need not be the case. Indeed, Epictetus makes no mention of salvation in this 
passage, and appears to need no saving. Rationalist philosophers would say that 
reason alone is sufficient deliverance from death’s terrors. Thus, Epictetus instead 
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speaks of instruction, and could be argued that that Paul is, as he writes, “just 
starting”: a novice, on the path to sagacity. The utterly uninstructed blames others 
for his plight (Adam and Eve, for example, or Cain30), while the novice blames 
himself (as Paul does here). The sage—one perfectly instructed, as Epictetus 
writes—blames neither others nor himself. Perhaps in entering into a spirited 
diatribe, as Paul does and in his style, we may be able to reveal the subtleties at 
work here. 
Are Adam and Eve responsible for humans’ morality because of their 
disobedience of God’s rules? Not necessarily: or, as Paul would write, of course not! 
It can be argued that they were simply curious, and were misled. Is the serpent, he 
who misled the two, responsible? Of course not! He was cunning, as he was 
created.31 Is God, He who created the three, responsible? Of course not! If God is 
good, his creatures are likewise created good. However, his creatures are not 
created immortal, though God is. As it is written: 
Then the LORD God said: See! The man has become like one of us, knowing 
good and evil! Now, what if he also reaches out his hand to take fruit from the 
tree of life, and eats of it and lives forever? The LORD God therefore banished 
him from the garden of Eden, to till the ground from which he had been 
taken.32  
 
Unless man had partaken from the fruit from the tree of life, as such, he could not 
have immortality. In other words, though life is, indeed, the end goal of the divine 
economy, death is not the cost of expulsion. 
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If not they, then who is to be held responsible? Are we? Of course not! We 
cannot, after all, partake of the tree of life now: immortality, here and now, is simply 
beyond us. It is for this reason that death did not appear horrible Socrates, as 
Epictetus points out, or to Paul, as he himself writes: Paul can, in more ways than 
this one, be understood as a sort of Christian Socrates, speaking to the Athenians on 
the Royal Porch as Socrates had been known to do. It was there that Socrates once 
spoke of piety to Euthyphro and was later accused of promoting foreign deities by 
Meletus.33 The Athenians misunderstand Paul from the outset of his speech, as it is 
written, in the same way that Socrates was misunderstood.34 It is with this in mind 
that we might not take Paul’s message to the Romans as instruction so much as 
invitation into dialogue and diatribe, much as we have here. 
 This is, indeed, what Jesus did. In inviting his disciples into conversation, he 
inevitably brings about a conversion, turning them ever away from themselves and 
toward the Father. Jesus said: 
 “Do not let your hearts be troubled. You have faith in God; have faith also in 
me. In my Father’s house there are many dwelling places. If there were not, 
would I have told you that I am going to prepare a place for you? And if I go 
and prepare a place for you, I will come back again and take you to myself, so 
that where I am you also may be. Where I am going you know the way.” 
Thomas said to him, “Master, we do not know where you are going; 
how can we know the way?” 
Jesus said to him, “I am the way and the truth and the life. No one 
comes to the Father except through me.”35 
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Just as Jesus challenges his disciples to reevaluate his message—his way, as it 
were—Paul challenges Rome to do the same. Epictetus simply remarks what Paul 
implies: Death has no sting.36 
Both Paul and Epictetus—students-of-sorts of Jesus and Socrates, 
respectively—go on to serve as excellent teachers for early Christians, despite 
theological and philosophical differences. The union of the two brings about an even 
greater understanding of the texts, one yielding insight into the other: Paul 
contextualizes Epictetus within the Christian tradition, while Epictetus offers 
practical guidance through the Pauline text. It is for this reason, it seems, that early 
Christians carried this handbook and used it, though not without some adjustment: 
Saint Nilus of Sinai, as John Lancaster Spalding remarks in the critical and 
biographical introduction to George Long’s translation of Epictetus’ Discourses.37 
Nilus, he writes, paraphrased and ultimately Christianized the manual, establishing 
it as a sort of rule of monastic living for himself and his brothers. 
That these discourses and writings followed Paul’s epistles and the Gospels is 
no accident, and it seems possible that Epictetus was aware of, and read, the 
Christian New Testament, especially Paul’s epistles. Though not himself a Christian, 
Epictetus’s quasi-theology was, at best, intentionally vague, neither clearly Stoic 
pantheism nor Christian monotheism. As Spalding notes:  
While the world view of the Stoic differs radically from the Christian, the 
moral teaching of the pagan philosopher and of the follower of Christ is often 
much the same. Both attach the highest importance to religious faith and 
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sentiment; both hold that virtue is the chief good; both emphasize the 
principle of liberty, and draw from it that of free personality; both declare 
that man holds his earthly possessions as a steward of the divine owner, to 
whom he is responsible for the use he makes of them.38 
 
Given the historical connections, conceptual similarities, and ethical common cause, 
it is possible to forge a new Enchiridion, a new handbook, for modern Christians—
not paraphrasing the Stoic one, as Nilus did, but contextualizing it within the 
Christian tradition as above. In the section that follows, I will argue for the creation 
of this manual as opposed to a paraphrase in the style of Nilus.  
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III. The Case for a Christian-Stoic Manual 
Why, if members of the early Church used the first manual, compose a 
second? Though the answer has, perhaps, already been hinted at, the question 
deserves to be explored in a bit more detail. After all, it could be argued that 
Stoicism might somehow twist the Christian message, or that Christianity might 
somehow distort the Stoic vision. The fact that Nilus used Epictetus’s manual at all is 
significant: Christians, at least at the time of Nilus, were already making use of that 
Stoic vision to better see the Christian way. Just as the Enchiridion served as a 
launching point for Nilus, it makes some sense that Christians preceding Nilus 
carried and used the manual, as did Epictetus’s students.  
Furthermore, Nilus may not have been the first Christian to Christianize the 
handbook. After all, Epictetus’s Enchiridion was compiled nearly three centuries 
before Nilus’s rule was completed. While it is possible that the Enchiridion did not 
reach Nilus’s home state of modern day Turkey until that time, this seems unlikely: 
after Alexander Hellenized Asia Minor–including Turkey–much of Greek literature, 
art and philosophy made its way through the empire.   
If these early, Hellenized Christians were already using Epictetus’s manual, it 
could be argued that the creation of a second manual is largely unnecessary. I argue 
that a more-modern manual is, indeed, necessary to satisfy the needs of the modern 
Church. The Church has, especially in the years following the Second Vatican 
Council, sought to keep up with the times and, as Bob Dylan once sang, “The times 
they are a-changin.’” Even the early Church did not receive the Enchiridion with 
open arms. The very fact that Nilus needed to Christianize and paraphrase the first 
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manual tells us that, even to the early Church, Epictetus’ message was not exactly 
compatible with Jesus’ and, perhaps even more importantly, with Paul’s. While Paul 
would hold that we keep our eyes set on Jesus, our teacher, Epictetus suggests that 
this is akin to childishness. As he writes: 
Whatever moral rules you have deliberately proposed to yourself, abide by 
them as they were laws, and as if you would be guilty of impiety by violating 
any of them. Don’t regard what anyone says of you, for this, after all, is no 
concern of yours. How long, then, will you put off thinking yourself worthy of 
the highest improvements and follow the distinctions of reason? You have 
received the philosophical theorems, with which you ought to be familiar, 
and you have been familiar with them. What other master, then, do you wait 
for, to throw upon the delay of reforming yourself? You are no longer a boy, 
but a grown man.  
If, therefore, you will be negligent and slothful, and always add 
procrastination to procrastination, purpose to purpose, and fix day after day 
in which you will attend to yourself, you will insensibly continue without 
proficiency, and, living and dying, persevere in being one of the vulgar. This 
instant, then, think yourself worthy of living as a man grown up, and a 
proficient. Let whatever appears to be the best be to you an inviolable law. 
And if any instance of pain or pleasure, or glory or disgrace, is set before you, 
remember that now is the combat, now the Olympiad comes on, nor can it be 
put off. By once being defeated and giving way, proficiency is lost, or by the 
contrary preserved. 
Thus Socrates became perfect, improving himself by everything, 
attending to nothing but reason. And though you are not yet a Socrates, you 
ought, however, to live as one desirous of becoming a Socrates.39 
 
While this advice seems both at once wise and blasphemous to the Christian, 
it begs thoughtful—and prayerful—contemplation in order to better follow it. Is it 
not best to do both what Jesus says and also what he does? Is this much not at the 
very heart of Christianity, to be as Christ? This manual will serve to do just that: a 
valuable tool for modern Christians seeking to be as Christ to the a-changin’ world. 
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This second manual will complement the first in much the same way that 
Stoicism compliments Christianity. It will be composed of a collection of essential 
Christian-Stoic teaching, representative of the practical intersection of Christian and 
Stoic thought. This manual will serve both as a practical guide to living, in much the 
same way that Epictetus’s manual did, and also as a weapon of sorts (the word 
Enchiridion can be translated as both “handbook” and “dagger”) with which 
Christians today can better “fight the good fight,” as it were.  
The teachings themselves will consist of seven short statements, each 
supported by two texts—one Stoic, one Christian. The Stoic text will be of the later 
Stoic period for largely practical reasons: Only complete manuscripts of the late Stoa 
(Gaius Musonius Rufus, Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius) have survived intact. 
Marcus Aurelius’s Meditations was written last of these late Stoa, sometime between 
170 and 180 CE. The Christian text will be a biblical passage whenever possible, in 
order to best highlight the philosophy of the Apostles. The Christian New Testament 
was supposed to have been written before 150 CE, which places these writings—
those of the Apostles and of the early Church—around the same time as the late 
Stoa.  
The texts will then be compared and contrasted, especially with regards to 
the teaching, in a reflection. The reflection will be one part scholarly investigation 
and one part prayerful meditation. The goal of this project, ultimately, is to distill 
these Christian-Stoic teachings, making them as accessible as humanly possible in 
order to make them as livable as humanly possible, without watering them down. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A MANUAL OF CHRISTIAN-STOIC TEACHINGS AND COMMENTARIES 
 
I. Seek Happiness 
 
Teachings 
 
The life that is happy is in harmony with its own nature. This can only come 
about when the mind is in a healthy state and in permanent possession of its 
own sanity, robust and vigorous, capable of the noblest endurance, 
responsive to circumstances, concerned for the body and all that affects it but 
not to the point of anxiety, conscientious about the other accouterments of 
life without being too enamored of any one thing, ready to make use of the 
gifts of fortune without being enslaved to them.  
– Seneca 40 
 
Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the 
Divine Essence. To make this clear, two points must be observed. First, that 
man is not perfectly happy, so long as something remains for him to desire 
and seek: secondly, that the perfection of any power is determined by the 
nature of its object. If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of 
some created effect, knows no more of God than “that He is”; the perfection of 
that intellect does not yet reach simply the First Cause, but there remains in 
it the natural desire to seek the cause. Consequently, for perfect happiness 
the intellect needs to reach the very Essence of the First Cause. And thus it 
will have its perfection through union with God as with that object, in which 
alone man’s happiness consists.  
– Thomas Aquinas41 
 
Commentary 
While it might at first seem that Seneca and St. Thomas Aquinas disagree about the 
nature of happiness, this could not be further from the truth. For both Seneca and 
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Thomas, one cannot be ultimately happy until she is first satisfied. Unless she wants 
for nothing and her physical needs met, her focus and attention will be on those 
physical needs. With her attention on those physical needs, her entire person begins 
to go flat, as it were, as the mind, body and spirit become unharmonious. This 
harmony is the essence of happiness for both Seneca and Thomas. 
Happiness is therefore like music, and these instruments of mind, body and 
spirit must be kept in tune in order to create beautiful pitches. Furthermore, one 
must look ahead to the next bar in order to succeed at playing. If her instrument is 
out of tune or she fails to look ahead, she will undoubtedly struggle to play the song 
well. These are but a few of the most basic markings of a true musician. A musician 
does not simply play music, but knows it intimately. Without an understanding of 
harmony and tuning, for example, her music is but a happy accident: little more than 
pleasant-sounding serendipity. One cannot be a musician accidently. Similarly, one 
cannot accidently be happy. 
The happy person, Seneca and Thomas would argue, knows these things, 
does these things and, as a result, can play any song well. In both understanding and 
applying these things, the happy person emerges as a better and, ultimately, a more 
beautiful person, able to make for herself even better and more beautiful things. 
Happiness is not simply the ultimate goal, after all: Happiness can be sought and 
found in the everyday and the ordinary insofar as it is a reflection of the exceptional 
and extraordinary, that is to say, God. How to best do this will be investigated in the 
following teachings. 
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II. Cultivate Virtue 
 
Teachings 
 
True happiness…is founded upon virtue. Of what will this virtue persuade 
you? That you should consider nothing either good or evil other than what is 
characterized by virtue or vice. Secondly, that you become immovable from 
the good and against evil so that, insofar as it is right to do so, you exemplify 
the divine. What does virtue promise in return for this outlay? Huge 
advantages, equivalent even to those of the gods: you will be under no 
compulsion, you will not be in want of anything, you will be free, secure, 
unassailable; you will attempt nothing in vain, be excluded from nothing; 
everything will come out according to your judgment; no setbacks will occur, 
nothing contrary to your wishes or expectations. 
– Seneca42 
 
Man’s virtue perfects him in relation to good. Now since the notion of good 
consists in ‘mode, species, and order,’ as Augustine states (De Nat. Boni. iii) 
or in ‘number, weight, and measure,’ as expressed in Wisdom 11:20, man’s 
good must needs be appraised with respect to some rule. Now this rule is 
twofold…human reason and Divine Law. And since Divine Law is the higher 
rule, it extends to more things, so that whatever is ruled by human reason, is 
ruled by the Divine Law too; but the converse does not hold.” 
– Thomas Aquinas43 
 
Commentary 
Virtue, for both Seneca and Thomas, sets one’s sight on the good and holds it fast. 
This good, Thomas asserts, is none other than God himself, the Divine Essence. By 
obeying nature’s rules–what Thomas refers to as “natural law”–as well as human 
reason and Divine Law, one becomes like God: After all, God, does nothing other 
than that which is his divine nature. Humans can do the same insofar as they act in 
accordance with their human nature.  
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This Divine Law is none other than what God does and is, as such, godly 
activity insofar as God cannot act outside his nature. It is for this reason that Seneca 
promises likewise godly rewards: Virtue brings freedom from compulsion and want, 
secure and unassailable, the ability to do anything and be left out from nothing as 
anything you judge, wish and expect will be as you judge, wish and expect without 
setback.  
While virtue is undoubtedly a discipline insofar as it is a good habit and, as 
such, must be put into practice, it is anything but restrictive. To be certain, the 
virtuous do only what is virtuous and never what is vicious. However, insofar as 
viciousness runs contrary to natural law, viciousness is, as a result, inherently 
unnatural. That one might hold fast to vice is ultimately more restrictive: If virtue 
frees the virtuous, as Seneca notes, it follows that vice enslaves the vicious to 
compulsion and want, for example. It is therefore against vice that the virtuous must 
rally.  
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III. Avoid Vice 
 
Teachings 
 
 Some things are in our control and others not. Things in our control are 
opinion, pursuit, desire, aversion, and, in a word, whatever are our own 
actions. Things not in our control are body, property, reputation, command, 
and, in one word, whatever are not our own actions…Aiming therefore at 
such great things, remember that you must not allow yourself to be carried, 
even with a slight tendency, towards the attainment of lesser things. Instead, 
you must entirely quit some things and for the present postpone the rest. But 
if you would have both these great things, along with power and riches, then 
you will not gain even the latter, because you aim for the former too: but you 
will absolutely fail of the former, by which alone happiness and freedom are 
achieved. Work, therefore to be able to say to every harsh appearance, ‘You 
are but an appearance, and not absolutely the thing you appear to be.’ And 
then examine it by those rules which you have, and first, and chiefly, by this: 
whether it concerns…anything not in our control, be prepared to say that it is 
nothing to you. 
– Epictetus44  
 
Therefore I tell you, do not worry about your life, what you will eat [or 
drink], or about your body, what you will wear. Is not life more than food and 
the body more than clothing? Look at the birds in the sky; they do not sow or 
real, they gather nothing into barns, yet your heavenly Father feeds them. 
Are not you more important than they? Can any of you by worrying add a 
single moment to your life-span? Why are you anxious about clothes? Learn 
from the way the wild flowers grow. They do not work or spin. But I tell you 
that not even Solomon in all his splendor was clothed like one of them. If God 
so clothes the grass of the field, which grows today and is thrown into the 
oven tomorrow, will he not much more provide for you, O you of little faith? 
So do not worry and say, ‘What are we to eat?’ or ‘What are we to drink?’ or 
‘What are we to wear?’ All these things the pagans seek. Your heavenly 
Father knows that you need them all. But seek first the kingdom (of God) and 
his righteousness, and all these things will be given you besides. Do not 
worry about tomorrow; tomorrow will take care of itself. Sufficient for a day 
is its own evil. 
– Jesus45 
                                                        
44 Epictetus, The Enchiridion, I. 
  38 
 
Commentary 
The “greater things,” as Epictetus writes—things in our control—are not necessarily 
virtuous, nor are the “lesser things”—things not in our control—necessarily vicious. 
Neither Epictetus nor the author of Matthew address, let alone argue, the inherent 
moral value of the things unto themselves. As Epictetus identifies, however, the 
things in our control are greater than the things not in our control. As such, we 
ought to set our sights on those greater things and not worry, as Matthew writes, 
about those lesser things. To do so is wise, as American theologian Reinhold 
Niebuhr noted in the famous prayer attributed to him, the Serenity Prayer.46  
Because wisdom is a virtue – one of the four Cardinal Virtues, for Thomas 
and others47 – it follows that to do so is also virtuous. To be concerned with those 
things both greater and lesser, or to otherwise regard the lesser as greater and the 
greater as lesser, is vicious insofar as it is concerned with today’s evils, as Matthew 
writes. Virtue and vice have more to do with prioritization, therefore, making sure 
to set one’s sights on those greater things and not on those lesser things or else 
squander them both. 
That wisdom is associated in this case with sight is no accident. Both 
Epictetus and Matthew concern themselves with appearances: For Epictetus, what 
he refers to as “harsh appearances,” the things that appear to be greater and may 
well be lesser, is of chief concern; for Matthew, clothing serves as little more than a 
                                                                                                                                                                     
45 Matthew 6: 25-34. 
46 Which reads, “God grant me serenity to accept the things I cannot change, courage to 
change the things I can, and wisdom to know the difference.” 
47 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II.1.61.2 
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distraction, though it is ultimately a necessity. Your Father in heaven, as Matthew 
writes, provides for these and all necessities. Therefore, they do not require your 
attention and only appear to do so. With this in mind, and any other harsh 
appearances seen in greater focus, what matters most also comes into focus.  
  40 
IV. Care for Others 
 
Teachings 
 
Everything that you see, everything human and divine, is one. We are all 
limbs of one all-encompassing body. Nature brought us into existence as 
creatures related to one another, forming us from the same elements for the 
same ends. She instilled in us reciprocal affection and made us innately 
sociable. She also invested us with a sense of fairness and justice…our hands 
are ready to assist those who need assistance… “I am human and I count 
nothing human as disconnected from me.” 
– Seneca48 
 
Now the body is not a single part, but many…as it is, God placed the parts, 
each one of them, in the body as he intended. If they were all one part, where 
would the body be? But as it is, there are many parts, yet one body…Indeed, 
the parts of the body that seem to be weaker are all the more necessary, and 
those parts of the body that we consider less honorable we surround with 
greater honor, and our less presentable parts are treated with greater 
propriety, whereas our more presentable parts do not need this. But God has 
so constructed the body as to give greater honor to a part that is without it, 
so that there may be no division in the body, but that the parts may have the 
same concern for one another. If one part suffers, all the parts suffer with it; 
if [one] part is honored, all the parts share its joy. 
– St. Paul49 
 
Commentary 
Here, both Paul and Seneca write at length about the interconnectedness of human 
beings, each singing the praises of communal living. Indeed, both the sage and the 
disciple are necessarily and naturally social, equipped, as Seneca writes, with 
reciprocal affection, a sense of fairness, justice and connection to others. All men—
and women—are endowed with these faculties and, as such, belong to the global, 
                                                        
48 Seneca, Moral Letters to Lucilius, Letter 95, in The Practice of Virtue: Classic and 
Contemporary Readings in Virtue Ethics, ed. Jennifer Welchman (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
2006) 
49 1 Corinthians 12:14, 18-20, 22-26. 
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human community. 
That all are connected communally, however, is not all that Paul and Seneca 
seem to be suggesting. The connection, for both men, is more than social: As “limbs 
of one all-encompassing body,” and “many parts” of “one body,” the connection is 
physical and visceral. The many parts, as it were, are interdependent as well as 
interconnected, physically needing the others in order to operate as intended (as in, 
at all). No part goes unnoticed, and no part can be considered extraneous.  
The vulnerable are given special attention with this in mind, as those who 
“need assistance,” our “less presentable parts,” are no less a part of the communities 
Seneca and Paul described. In fact, for Paul, caring for the less presentable is the 
responsibility of the more presentable. After all, these less presentable parts of the 
body are all the more vital it, just as the heart is more vital than the hand. It is with 
this in mind that we must care for one another.  
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V. Resist Caring Too Much 
 
Teachings 
 
In everything which pleases the soul, or supplies a want, or is loved, 
remember to add this to the (description, notion); what is the nature of each 
thing, beginning from the smallest? If you love an earthen vessel, say it is an 
earthen vessel [that] you love; for when it has been broken, you will not be 
disturbed. If you are kissing your child or wife, say that it is a human being 
whom you are kissing, for when the wife or child dies, you will not be 
disturbed. 
– Epictetus50 
 
God has made everything appropriate to its time, but has put the timeless 
into their hearts so they cannot find out, from beginning to end, the work 
which God has done. I recognized that there is nothing better than to rejoice 
and to do well during life. Moreover, that all can eat and drink and enjoy the 
good of all their toil—this is a gift of God. I recognized that whatever God 
does will endure forever; there is no adding to it, or taking from it. Thus has 
God done that he may be revered. What now is has already been; what is to 
be, already is: God retrieves what has gone by. 
– The Book of Ecclesiastes51 
 
Commentary 
Everything of the earth is a gift from God, as it is written above. An earthen vessel—
a clay pot, for example, or a favorite mug—is by nature of the earth, and things of 
the earth break. As the author of Ecclesiastes notes, this cannot be changed: This 
was the state of things yesterday, is the state of things today, and will be the state of 
things tomorrow. This is good just as the one who made it is good, and ought to be 
celebrated as such. 
                                                        
50 Epictetus, The Enchiridion, III. 
51 Ecclesiastes 3:11-15. 
  43 
However, it is not always easy to celebrate this, especially with regards to 
human beings—are we not, also, of the earth? Is it not disturbing when we break? 
After all, human beings are not mugs! If human beings are of greater import than the 
birds of the sky of the flowers of the earth, as we read in the book of Ecclesiastes,52 
surely we are of greater import than mugs. Mugs neither think, nor feel…live, nor 
die. Mugs either work or do not, and their value resides almost solely in their ability 
to do just that: work. 
We are, however, earthen vessels and, like all other earthen vessels–mugs 
included–we are breakable. In that way, we are no greater than any other earthen 
vessel, or flower, or bird. Though we do not know the appropriate time, we have 
faith that, when we have gone by, God will retrieve us, too, as it is written. That we–
and all of creation with us–will not be forgotten and discarded, broken though we 
may be, is worth rejoicing.   
                                                        
52 Matthew 6: 25-34, or as discussed in III. 
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VI. Care Little for Material Possessions 
Teachings 
If my wealth should melt away it would deprive me of nothing but itself, but 
if yours were to depart you would be stunned and feel you were deprived of 
what makes you yourself. With me, wealth has a certain place; in your case it 
has the highest place. In short, I own my wealth, your wealth owns you. 
– Seneca53 
 
Do not store up for yourselves treasures on earth, where moth and decay 
destroy, and thieves break in and steal. But store up treasures in heaven, 
where neither moth nor decay destroys, nor thieves break in and steal. For 
where your treasure is, there also will your heart be…No one can serve two 
masters. He will either hate one and love the other, or be devoted to one and 
despise the other. You cannot serve God and mammon. 
– Jesus54 
Commentary 
Neither writer denounces wealth outright, but each recognizes that putting wealth 
front and center is an error in judgment. One must own his property and not be 
owned by it, as Seneca writes, serving God and not mammon, Jesus’ Aramaic word 
for “wealth” or “property”. As such, one must “hate” his wealth in order to own it 
and serve God, lest he love it and, in doing so, be owned by it and serve it.  As Seneca 
writes, wealth “has a certain place”: not as a book has a place on a shelf, but as a line 
item on a list of priorities.  
It is with this list in mind that the “hatred” previously mentioned gains some 
context: Hatred is comparative, akin to loving less, much as Kierkegaard explored in 
Fear and Trembling. In the book of Genesis,55 God asks Abraham to sacrifice his 
                                                        
53 On the Happy Life, XXI. 
54 Matthew 6:19-21, 24. 
55 Genesis 22:1-19. 
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beloved son, Isaac. Without so much as a second thought, he sets off to do just that. 
How could he? In comparison to the love Abraham had for God, his love for Isaac 
was infinitely less. In effect, Abraham comparatively “hated” Isaac. 
It is with this in mind that we must hate our wealth. Unless we do, we will 
find it impossible to own our wealth, succumbing instead to the power of mammon. 
It is in this way that mammon can become for us an entity, as Milton imagined in 
Paradise Lost. As Seneca and Matthew seem to agree, however, mammon has no 
power to speak of. If we own our wealth and serve God, we will recognize that 
mammon is merely the name of a vice we already know all too well: greed.    
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VII. Never Lose Sight of the Goal 
 
Teachings 
 
Consider when, on a voyage, your ship is anchored; if you go on shore to get 
water you may along the way amuse yourself with picking up a shellfish, or 
an onion. However, your thoughts and continual attention ought to be bent 
towards the ship, waiting for the captain to call on board; you must then 
immediately leave all these things, otherwise you will be thrown into the 
ship, bound neck and feet like a sheep. So it is with life. If, instead of an onion 
or a shellfish, you are given a wife or child, that is fine. But if the captain calls, 
you must run to the ship, leaving them, and regarding none of them. But if 
you are old, never go far from the ship: lest, when you are called, you should 
be unable to come in time. 
– Epictetus56 
 
Although I am free in regard to all, I have made myself a slave to all so as to 
win over as many as possible. To the Jews I became like a Jew to win over 
Jews; to those under the law I became like one under the law—though I 
myself am not under the law—to win over those under the law. To those 
outside the law I became like on outside the law—though I am not outside 
God’s law but within the law of Christ—to win over those outside the law. To 
the weak I became weak, to win over the weak. I have become all things to 
all, to save at least some. All this I do for the sake of the gospel, so that I too 
may have a share in it. Do you not know that the runners in the stadium all 
run in the race, but only one wins the prize? Run so as to win. Every athlete 
exercises discipline in every way. They do it to win a perishable crown, but 
we an imperishable one. Thus I do not run aimlessly; I do not fight as if I were 
shadowboxing. No, I drive my body and train it, for fear that, after having 
preached to others, I myself should be disqualified. 
– St. Paul57 
 
Commentary 
In many ways, this is the very heart of the project: training. If we do not train, we 
can never hope to finish the race, let alone win it. We will find, as Epictetus remarks, 
                                                        
56 Epictetus, The Enchiridion, VII. 
57 1 Corinthians 9: 19-27. 
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that the things that amuse us—be it shellfish, onion, wife or child—can distract 
enough so as to mask the discharge of the starting gun. Unless we are listening for it 
specifically, knowing the sound and even the scent of the gunpowder explosion, we 
might even forget that we are running a race, let alone the race.  
Interestingly, both Epictetus and Paul suggest that this training is both 
spiritual and bodily: The mind must be ever bent toward the virtues of the mind, 
and the body toward the bodily. Unless our appetites are properly curbed, we will 
be powerless to resist the sweetness of the onion, experienced by the reflective 
mind, and the carnal pleasure of the flesh, experienced by the sensory body. The 
metaphor of running the race is, therefore, fitting: The combat and the Olympiad are 
not merely imagined, but experienced in the here and now. 
 It is fitting, then, that the manual ends in the here and now. As you begin your 
training–cultivating virtue and avoiding vice; caring for others, though, not too 
much, and; caring little for physical possessions–you must not lose sight of your 
goal, that is, the very goal of Christian-Stoicism: happiness. This manual, inspired by 
the manuals of Epictetus and Nilus, serves as a starting-off point for the novice on 
the path to sagacity.  
This manual is not, and cannot be, the end-all, be-all of Christian-Stoicism. It 
is not, after all, the race itself, but the means to ultimately win the race: the race, that 
is, toward a good and happily lived life. With virtue as your guide and your priorities 
straight, only the matter of actually running the thing–putting your training into 
practice–lies ahead of you. The starting pistol has been raised. On your mark…get 
set…live!   
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